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The capacity to resist attacks from the environment is crucial to the survival of all organisms.
We quantitatively analyze the susceptibility of protein interaction networks of numerous organisms
to random and malicious attacks. We find for all organisms studied that random rewiring improves
protein network robustness, so that actual networks are more fragile than rewired surrogates. This
unexpected fragility contrasts with the behavior of networks such as the Internet, whose robustness
decreases with random rewiring. We trace this surprising effect to the modular structure of protein
networks.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, prodigiously detailed maps
of protein interaction networks (PPI) have been produced
[1, 2]. These networks in principle present a record of all
metabolic processes and their inter-relations, but in prac-
tice the number of chemical actors and the complexity of
their interactions make the networks difficult to decipher
[3]. In this letter, we show that notwithstanding their
apparent complexity, it is possible to establish common
features of protein networks starting from a few simple
principles[4–7].
We begin with the observation, illustrated in Fig. 1,
that biological protein networks involve both common
processes that all cells must use (e.g. enzymes involved
in the Krebs cycle, marked with red labels in Fig. 1) and
what are termed modular processes [8–10] that appear
only in special situations (e.g. guidance molecules used
only during particular circumstances, as development, re-
production, or response to heat stress, indicated by blue
labels in Fig. 1). As we will show, this modular or-
ganization produces common, and predictable, network
properties shared by all organisms studied. We focus
in particular on the fragility of biological networks - a
property of manifest importance for survival - to attacks
by interruption of individual protein function. To this
end, we evaluate the extent to which protein interaction
networks of 20 different organisms ranging from bacteria
and plants to homo sapiens (Table I) can be disrupted
by either random or targeted attacks.
As we have remarked, the modular construction shown
in Fig. 1 consists of a highly interconnected core of pro-
teins, accompanied by satellite clusters with ”hub” pro-
teins weakly connected to the core. As a consequence,
three predictions can readily be made. First, this type
of network can be expected to be vulnerable to attacks
that interrupt the few hub proteins, but should be com-
paratively robust against attacks that interrupt any of
the more numerous proteins attached to ’spokes’ of these
Figure 1. (color online) protein network for C. Elegans [24].
Modular proteins identified include F09C12.7, an element of
major sperm protein, K08B4.1a involved in embryonic devel-
opment and notch, and F26D10.3.2, which is a heat shock pro-
tein. On the other hand, the proteins identified in the central
complex are essential to the Krebs cycle: F22D6.4.2 encodes a
subunit of NADH dehydrogenase, E04A4.7.4 is better known
as cytochrome c 2.1, and C34E10.6.3 is ATP synthase.
hubs [9]. Thus random attacks are unlikely to signif-
icantly interrupt function, while malicious attacks di-
rected against one or more hub proteins are likely to dis-
rupt the network. Second, through countless generations
of attacks, we expect evolution to have tuned biological
networks to be more robust against attacks than statisti-
cally comparable, but non-biological, networks. Third,
through the same reasoning we expect biological net-
works to be optimal in that alternative interconnections
should worsen robustness. As we will show, these pre-
dictions are largely correct, but admit unexpected and
revealing failures.
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Figure 2. Robustness of the 20 protein networks from Table
I against random and malicious attacks. Notice that for ev-
ery organism studied, the robustness against random attacks
is smaller than surrogates with identical degree distributions,
while the robustness against malicious attacks is larger than
such surrogates. Solid and open symbols correspond, respec-
tively, to biological data and surrogates. Error bars, defining
standard deviations over 20 randomized surrogate trials, are
smaller than the symbol sizes.
Organism ID N M 〈k〉
Drosophila melanogaster - AA 1 3960 44409 22.4
Gallus gallus - AC 2 3723 54131 29.1
Homo sapiens - AC 3 12299 176316 28.7
Mus musculus - AC 4 9595 123665 25.8
Xenopus tropicalis - AC 5 1870 7374 7.9
Caenorhabditis elegans - AN 6 2113 14261 13.5
Aspergillus fumigatus - FA 7 2364 29288 24.8
Saccharomyces cerevisae - FA 8 5209 66057 25.4
Schizosaccharomyces pombe - FA 9 2458 28822 23.5
Arabidopsis thaliana - PM 10 4205 81957 40.0
Rhodococcus sp - AB 11 5540 57992 20.9
Saccharopolyspora erythraea - AB 12 3715 24691 13.3
Aeromonas hydrophila - PB 13 2765 13849 10.0
Bradyrhizobium japonicum - PB 14 4948 29628 12.0
Citrobacter koseri - PB 15 3477 17288 9.9
Escherichia coli - PB 16 3542 25197 14.2
Nocardia farcinica - PB 17 3277 21359 13.0
Pseudomonas aeruginosa - PB 18 3709 20401 11.0
Serratia proteamaculans - PB 19 3392 16978 10.0
Vibrio cholerae - PB 20 2506 12899 10.3
TABLE I. List of organisms investigated. Acronyms in col-
umn 1 indicate kingdom and phylum the organisms belong
to: AA - Animalia Arthropoda; AB - Actinum Bacteria; AC
- Animalia Chordata; AN - Animalia Nematoda; FA - Funghi
Ascomycota; PB - Bacteria Proteo; PM - Plantae Magnolio-
phyta. The ID (second column) is used to identify organisms
in Figs. 2 and 4. Columns 3, 4 and 5 define the numbers of
nodes in the largest cluster N , total numbers of edges M , and
average degree 〈k〉. Shadings correspond to Fig. 2.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We examine protein networks of 20 different organisms
in the bacteria and eukarya domains, identified in Table
1 along with numbers of nodes N (i.e. proteins), edges M
(connections between proteins), and the average degree
〈k〉 (number of connections per protein) of the largest
connected component of each network. Our measure of
robustness is essentially unaffected by the small number
of isolated nodes that are detached from the largest clus-
ter, so we neglect these in our analysis. We used the
STRING 8.2 ”Combined Score“ (CS) [18], a measure of
the likelihood that two proteins interact in a given net-
work, to impose the criterion that edges ei,j are included
in the network only if CSij is over a threshold value,
CSth = 70%. Smaller values of CSth produce dramatic
growth in numbers of edges, masking relevant informa-
tion with extraneous information, while larger CSth ex-
cludes known protein interactions [19].
Typical results are presented in Figs.2-4, showing the de-
pendence of robustness on random and malicious attacks
for several network types. As one would expect, for all
networks the tolerance to random attacks is high (Fig.
2, red data) and to malicious attacks is low (Fig. 2,
blue data). However unexpectedly we find that all bio-
logical networks studied have a significantly lower resis-
tance to random attacks, and significantly higher resis-
tance to malicious attacks than do surrogates, random-
ized TM = 10
8 times, as described previously. This para-
doxical behavior is surprising, and can be analyzed in
further detail as shown in Fig. 3. In that figure, we
plot detailed responses to systematic randomization, us-
ing C. Elegans as an exemplar, compared with several
non-biological networks.
For all networks in Fig. 3(a), we find that small amounts
of random rewiring improve network robustness to ran-
dom attacks; for biological and other modular networks
(for example airlines, shown as triangles in the plot), the
improvement is much larger than for less obviously mod-
ular networks such as citations or access points (”points-
of-presence“) to the Internet. By contrast, the behav-
ior of a second class of highly redundant networks, for
example the entire Internet or corporate ownership net-
works, is shown in the insets to Fig. 3. These networks
are nearly optimally robust, since switching connections
tends to reduce network robustness.
Thus a first and unexpected finding of this analysis so
far is that as shown in Fig. 3(a), biological proteins and
other modular networks are less than ideally organized
from the point of view of robustness against random at-
tacks, insofar as this robustness can be significantly im-
proved by any amount of rewiring. A second unexpected
finding, shown in Fig. 3(b), is that although biological
protein networks are more than twice as robust against
malicious attacks as any other network tested, modest
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Figure 3. Fundamentally different behaviors of fragile and
robust networks. Robustness against random attacks, RRA,
increases with an increasing fraction C/M of changed edges
for C. Elegans(filled circles) and other networks such as air-
line (triangles)[25], citation(stars)[26] and point-of-presence
networks (open circles)[27], while by contrast network robust-
ness decreases with C/M for the Internet (squares)[20] and
corporate ownership network (diamonds)[22]. Note that the
improvement in robustness against random attacks is signif-
icantly larger for C. Elegans and airline networks, both of
which are modular, and is opposite to that of the Internet
(inset). Likewise the robustness against malicious attacks,
RHDA, differs between biological and other networks. RHDA
increases with C/M up to 12% until C/M ≈ 1, after which
RHDA decreases for biological networks, in contrast with all
other networks except for the ownership network, for which
RHDA monotonically increases with C/M . For better visibil-
ity some data are shown in the insets having abscissas using
the same axes as the main plot; curve fits are included to aid
the eye.
modifications of the protein interaction structure can im-
prove the network robustness from 2% for H. Sapiens and
12% for C. Elegans (Fig. 3(b)) up to 28% for G. Gallus.
Apparently, despite the manifest two-fold improvement
in robustness shown in Fig. 3(b) that evolution has pro-
duced, life remains among a class of networks that are
more fragile to either random or malicious attacks than
slightly modified surrogates.
This effect, which holds for all of the 20 organisms stud-
ied, differs markedly from a second class of networks,
shown in the insets to Fig’s 3(a)-(b), that is exemplified
by the Internet [20], which was designed for maximal ro-
bustness against errors [21], and to a lesser extent corpo-
rate ownership networks, that are robust by virtue of sim-
ilarly numerous inter-relations [22]. Our findings there-
fore indicate that although the Internet and PPI net-
works share broad degree distributions, the two types of
networks behave fundamentally differently in their over-
all fragility as measured by comparison with modified
surrogates.
To investigate the consistency of these results, we re-
peated our analyses under various modifications. First,
we evaluated the reliability of the data itself by consid-
ering both a higher value of the threshold likelihood of
protein interactions, CSth = 80%, as well as data from a
Figure 4. Effects of modularity on robustness in model
(curves) and sample biological networks (data points, for C.
Elegans). Insets show simple network (left) and more complex
network (right) fit to C. Elegans data. Network robustnesses
are shown as dashed and solid lines respectively.
different version of STRING 8.1 [23]. Second, we consid-
ered whether the robustness could be an indirect effect
of a change in correlation between nodes - for example
as high degree nodes are swapped with low degree ones.
For this purpose, we modified the rewiring to preserve
correlations by performing swaps between pairs of nodes
{(i, j), (k, `)} → {(i, `), (k, j)} only if the degrees of i and
k or j and ` are equal. Third, we considered the effect of
randomly removing individual edges described again by
Eq. 2, but with N defined to be the number or edges,
rather than nodes. In each of these independent tests,
we found the same features commented on for Fig’s 2
and 3, supporting the two key results that biological net-
works exhibit more fragility to random errors than simi-
lar non-biological networks, and that although biological
networks are more than twice as robust against malicious
attacks as non-biological networks, they remain less than
optimal.
We have reported three curious and previously unex-
plored properties of protein-protein interaction (PPI)
networks. (1) PPI networks are less robust against ran-
dom attacks than surrogates with identical numbers of
nodes, edges, and degree distributions; (2) PPI net-
works are more robust against malicious attacks than
surrogates; and (3) despite millenia of evolutionary pres-
sure, PPI network robustness against malicious attacks
remains suboptimal and can be improved by modest
rewiring.
To analyze the causes of these unexpected behaviors,
we return to the observation made earlier that PPI net-
works are intrinsically modular. Since modules have
many fewer nodes than the central network, it follows
that any switch involving a node in a module is highly
likely to involve a second connection that is outside of
the module. Such a switch will produce two new edges,
4both of which will connect the module to the central net-
work, so switching connections will typically increase the
number of connections from a module to the central net-
work. This in turn will improve the robustness of that
module to either random or malicious attack, since such
a switch would increase the number of connections that
would have to be broken between the module and the
rest of the network.
We can test this mechanism by constructing model net-
works with suitable properties, two of which are shown in
Fig. 4. In that figure, we compare both simple and more
finely tuned model networks with the biological data that
appear as solid symbols in Fig. 3. The simple model (left
inset) is constructed by creating a central large complex
with broad degree distribution. An arbitrary small num-
ber (eight, here) of modules, each with different number
of nodes but the same number of random connections, are
added and are attached to random nodes in the central
complex by two connections. The robustness in response
to random and malicious attacks is then evaluated ex-
actly as before, and is plotted in Fig. 4 as dashed curves.
By contrast, non-modular model networks that we have
constructed (not shown) have few vital hubs and so ex-
hibit identical responses to either random or malicious
attacks, with no dependence on C/M .
Evidently, the qualitative behavior of biological re-
sponses to random as well as malicious attacks can be
attributed to the modular structure of biological protein
networks. Indeed, it is not difficult to tune the model
network to nearly exactly fit the biological data. This is
shown in the right inset of Fig. 4, where we display a
fictitious network whose random and malicious response
curves are shown as solid lines in the main plot. This
network is constructed by choosing the number of con-
nections of the model to be similar to the biological one.
In detail, the nodes are distributed in 20 modules with
different densities, in which high degree nodes are prefer-
entially connected to high degree nodes. This preferen-
tial connectivity is crucial to the reduction in robustness
to malicious attacks: for no other structural feature in-
vestigated was this reduction seen. These modules are
connected preferentially to the largest module with few
connections, as we have remarked occurs in biological
networks.
Thus the first, simpler, network of Fig. 4 demonstrates
that the presence of modularity is sufficient to qualitative
account for most of the curious behaviors of PPI network
robustness in response to both random and malicious at-
tacks.
Back to Fig’s 2 and 3, they show that for surrogates
with large numbers of switches of connections, the ro-
bustness of PPI networks to malicious attacks actually
decreases for all organisms studied. This behavior can
also be reproduced in model networks provided, crucially,
that connections are preferentially included between high
degree nodes. In this case, two competing effects arise.
The randomization of the modules increases robustness,
while the vanishing of the preferential connections de-
creases the robustness. In case of random attack the
second effect is negligible, but for malicious attacks, it
leads to the surprising decrease in robustness that we
have noted.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that biological
protein networks are unexpectedly fragile against either
random or malicious attacks. This fragility is measurable
by comparison with surrogates with identical network
statistics. We find that these behaviors are characteristic
of modular networks, in which particular products or
processes inhabit isolated modules. As anticipated
earlier in this letter, we have confirmed (1) that this
modular structure causes biological protein networks to
be more vulnerable to targeted than random attacks,
and (2) that through evolution these networks have be-
come more robust than non-biological networks against
malicious attacks. Nevertheless, as we have shown, pro-
tein networks are more fragile than extensively rewired
surrogates to random attacks, while being less fragile
than the same surrogates to malicious attacks. We
find that this final phenomenon is associated with the
apparently unique tendency of high degree nodes in PPI
networks to preferentially connect to other high degree
nodes. We speculate that this preferential connectivity
may have practical advantages, for example in pro-
viding redundant pathways to permit key processes to
function after a malicious attack or genetic deletion [4–6].
METHODS
To test these predictions, we compare known pro-
tein networks with surrogates that are as statistically
similar as possible. To this end, we generate random-
ized surrogate networks having the same size and de-
gree distribution as true biological networks. To cre-
ate such surrogates, we perform a sequence of randomly
chosen switches of connections between pairs of nodes
{(i, j), (k, `)} → {(i, `), (k, j)} in a network, so that each
node preserves its number of neighbors [11]. The random-
izing algorithm is repeated TM times, where TM ranges
from 0 to 108. For the organisms we study, TM = 10
8
ensures that each edge has been swapped more than 103
times, effectively destroying any initial correlation in the
network. We evaluate correlations between nodes by cal-
culating nearest neighbor average connectivity[12]
knn(k) =
∑
k′
k′P (k′|k), (1)
where P (k′|k) is the conditional probability that a node
with degree k is connected with one of degree k′. Indeed
the created surrogates are uncorrelated.
5Given a network and its surrogates, we evaluate the ”ro-
bustness” (defined shortly) of the network to random
or targeted, malicious, attacks. For biological networks,
random attacks (RA)[13] take into account single gene
changes due to radiation or mutagen exposure and er-
rors in transcription. By contrast, malicious attacks de-
scribe situations in which pathogens or toxins interfere
with high degree hubs of the network. Such an attack
is termed a ”high degree based adaptive attack (HDA)”
in the literature [14–16]. To define the robustness of a
network against either random or malicious attack, we
evaluate the sum of the fractions of the largest connected
cluster while removing all nodes,
R =
1
N + 1
N∑
q=0
s(q), (2)
where N is the number of nodes in the network and s(q)
is the fraction of nodes in the largest connected cluster
after removing q nodes. This measure has the advantage
over other, e.g. percolation [14], metrics of robustness in
that it can distinguish between different networks with
similar ”percolation thresholds“, at which a significant
number of elements of a network form a single cluster
[17]. The normalization 1N+1 in Eq. (2) ensures that
the robustness is comparable for different network sizes,
and the value of R lies between 1N+1 and 0.5. The lower
limit on R corresponds to entirely isolated nodes, and
R = 0.5 defines a network where all unattacked nodes
remain in a single cluster.
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